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ZÜBEYDE GÜNE-YADCY

Russia's expansion towards the Caucasus, which started during the reign of Ivan IV ('the Terrible', 1533–1584) intensified under Peter I ('the Great', 1682–1725). Peter reshaped Russia entirely and redefined its foreign policy objectives. He was aware of the importance of the Mediterranean in world politics and of the Caucasus not only as a bridge between Europe and Asia but also as a means of access to markets and raw materials.¹ Therefore, Peter joined the European alliance against the Ottoman Empire in the war of 1683–1699. The peace treaty of Istanbul (13 June 1700) confirmed Russia's control of the fortress of Azak (Azov)—her first step to the Black Sea. Although Peter's defeat in 1711 returned Azak to the Ottomans, it stopped Russia's advance towards both the Balkans and the Black Sea only for a short period.

After this defeat, Peter turned to the Caucasus. In 1722, when the Safavid dynasty fell, leaving the country in chaos, he moved his army in that direction. On 15 June he captured Derbend and a short while later, Baku. Apparently, the immediate success of the Russian advance was related to the fact that without the Safavids, Daghestan and Azerbaijan were divided among many rival polities that were unable to unite against a common enemy.² However, the campaign triggered an Ottoman response.

Since the Caucasus had long been a bone of contention between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, Istanbul did not intend to leave it to a new contender now. Thus, an Ottoman campaign in the Caucasus captured Revan, Nakhichevan, Lori and Ganja and blocked the Russian advance into the region. On 24 June 1724 the Treaty of Istanbul partitioned the Caucasus between Russia and the Ottomans. From Russia's point of view, the most important achievement was the fact that she now controlled Northern Shirvan, Mazanderan, Gilan and Estera-bad, which opened the way to the Southern Caucasus.³

Nadir Shah (1736–1747) established a powerful government in Iran, which returned in force to the Caucasus at the expense of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1735 a treaty was signed between Iran and Russia, following which

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Russian forces withdrew from all the territories they had controlled according to the Istanbul Treaty of 1724.⁴ The Ottoman Empire resumed its influence in the Southern Caucasus only after the disorder in Iran following the assassination of Nadir Shah. This influence was to a great extent due to the fact that the Muslim communities in the Caucasus sided with the Ottomans against Russia's growing power.⁵

Russia gained her first permanent success in the Caucasus in the war of 1735–1739, attacking the banks of the Kuban River. The Ottoman Empire was forced to agree to the independence of Kabarda in the Treaty of Belgrade.⁶ This was clearly in Russia's interest, since it enabled her greater freedom of action in the region. Russian pressure led the tribes of the Caucasus to approach the Ottoman Empire.⁷

The Russian advance into the Caucasus gathered momentum during the reign of Catherine II ('the Great', 1762–1796). Immediately after coming to power, she ordered work to begin on the extension of the Cossack defence line westward along the Terek. A fortress was constructed in Mozdok in 1763, and Cossacks, together with Christian Kabartays, were settled in the region.⁸ The next step was to establish a line of forts from Mozdok to the Sea of Azak, aimed, *inter alia*, at bringing the central Caucasus under Russian control.⁹ These activities, which were at first ignored by the Ottomans and the local tribes, soon enabled Russia to move towards the Taman peninsula. For the Caucasus, it meant the beginning of an intensive struggle.¹⁰

The Russo–Ottoman war of 1768–1774 provided Russia with further major gains. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) officially ended Ottoman sovereignty over the Crimean Khanate and the river Kuban was recognised as Russia's border, meaning that the entire territory north of the river had now become Russian. In 1782, seven years after the Crimean Khanate had officially been declared independent, Russia annexed it.¹¹ Then, the Circassian and Nogay tribes living north of the Kuban River were pushed south of it,¹² and Don Cossacks as well as Russians, Germans and others were settled in their place.¹³ At the same time, Russia was trying to advance in the southern Caucasus as well. In July 1783, a treaty was signed between Catherine and Irakli II, the king of Kartli and Kakheti (Eastern Georgia), which put Georgia under Russian protection.¹⁴

All these events prompted the north Caucasian tribes to resist the Russian advance.¹⁵ The Circassians, after a series of meetings, decided to approach the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶ They sent a delegation to Istanbul headed by Zaniko Mehmet Giray, which was received by Abdülhamid I (1774–1789). The Sultan promised them aid, including the stationing of a garrison in the fort of Soğucak. Until the arrival of the Ottoman force, Zaniko Mehmet Giray was appointed commander.¹⁷ This was in line with Ottoman policy, since the Russian advance in the Caucasus had become a serious matter for the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans indeed constructed a series of forts on the eastern shore of the Black Sea—Fash and Sohüm¹⁸ in the south and Soğucak¹⁹ and Anapa²⁰ in the north. The Caucasus became important to the Ottomans especially after Küçük Kaynarca: With the

loss of the Crimea, the Caucasus was considered an alternative to it both for the deployment of the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea and as a source of military manpower—the Caucasian tribes—which the Ottomans could mobilise against Russia.²¹

Russian encroachment in the Caucasus aroused resentment that developed into resistance of a religious character. Military and religious efforts by the Ottomans supported this development in a region where religion had never before been in the front line.²² The first to initiate resistance under the banner of Islam was Shaykh Mansur, probably the first Naqshbandi sheikh in the north Caucasus,²³ whose movement the Russians were later to call Muridism.²⁴

Who Was Mansur?

There are a number of different versions of Mansur's identity and origins. According to Professor Ottino and the journalist Ancona, Mansur was of Italian origin, his real name being Giovanni Battista Boetti. Ottino, who conducted research in the state archives in Turin for many years, claimed that Mansur was the son of a notary who left home to study medicine. Having an adventurous personality, Boetti travelled widely. He went to the Near East as a Dominican priest and travelled through Anatolia, Palestine and Cyprus. He even visited St Petersburg. Finally, he appeared in eastern Anatolia as the leader of the Kurds and raided Bitlis, Kars, Akhalkileki and Tiflis.²⁵ Moreover, in 1876 Ottino published the letters Mansur had supposedly sent to his father from Russian captivity.²⁶ Some Tsarist Russian historians accepted Ottino's assertions.

Others claimed that Mansur was Italian, but said he was a Jesuit priest named Elisa Mansur, who went to Anatolia to convert its Orthodox population to Catholicism, which, naturally drew the Pope's anger.²⁷ However, after a short while he converted to Islam and was sent by the Ottoman Sultan to the Caucasus to organise the resistance to Russia. Paul Henze seems to agree with Ottino and Ancona that Mansur was of Italian origin, and that he was an Ottoman emissary.²⁸

Mirza Hasan Daghestani has also claimed that Mansur was sent by the Sultan.²⁹ This concept reached a peak of popularity in the 1950s, when Soviet historians labelled Mansur and Sheikh Shamil 'Turkish collaborator and English agent'.³⁰ Alexander Mirza Kazem Bek, on the other hand, alleged that Mansur was a Tatar from Orenburg who had been educated in Bukhara.³¹ Iorga, in the fifth volume of his *History of the Ottomans*, states that Mansur was a Nogay, which makes him a native of the Caucasus.³²

Events in the Caucasus and Mansur's activities after his appearance, however, support neither the view that he was a foreign adventurer nor the claim that he was an Ottoman agent. The fact is that he knew the people of the Caucasus well. He understood how to address them, touch their religious sentiments and incite them against their common enemy, Russia. Although he failed to unite the entire population of the Caucasus, he did unite a great part of it: thousands of people followed Mansur into battle against Russia. Therefore, there can be little

doubt that Mansur was a Chechen. Indeed, according to Baddeley, some Russian military reports stated as much.³³

Sheikh Mansur was born in the village of Aldi in Chechnya in 1722.³⁴ His original name was Ushurma,³⁵ but he changed it to Mansur after his appearance on the Caucasian scene. He was born into a humble family and his life style was modest. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, a 19th century Ottoman historian, maintains that as a child, Ushurma was a shepherd;³⁶ this is also stated in Ottoman archival documents.³⁷ It is unclear whether he received any education. Cemal Gökçe writes that Mansur had no education at all.³⁸ Some Russian historians believed that he might have been educated in Bukhara.³⁹ It is evident from his pamphlets that he knew Arabic,⁴⁰ which might indicate something about his background.

His struggle against Russia

Mansur began his activity in mid 1785 by sending a number of letters appealing to the Muslims of the Caucasus. In these he declared that he had been sent by Allah to struggle against the infidel Russians. One such appeal stated:

O believers! Know that your life is full of ignorance, and that you have committed sins by drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. Now you have an opportunity to rectify your mistakes and to find a way out. Repent sincerely before death comes to you. Those who repent will be redeemed. Be afraid of Allah, and place the fear of Allah in your hearts. Forgive murderers; because Allah says that he who overcomes his anger and forgives is a true believer. Do not worship idols, because if you worship idols you are pagans. Give alms to the poor, and fight against the enemy.⁴¹

In another appeal he said:

Anything Russian is forbidden, as is any manner resembling that of the Russians. If you get ill do not go to a Russian physician, because you might end up befriending him.⁴²

Obviously, the purpose of such warnings was to unite the people around a feeling of enmity toward Russia. Shaykh Mansur tried to convince the Caucasian tribes that if they did not fight for their freedom they would lose it, and that their only chance for success lay in unity. Since the only factor capable of uniting the various tribes was religion, Mansur attempted to unite Daghestan and Chechnya in the struggle, legitimising his movement and leadership by giving them a religious and mystical tone.⁴³ He told the people that his mission had been revealed to him by the Prophet, who had come to him in a dream.⁴⁴ One can say that he was partly successful in his mission, though obviously he was unable to unite all the Caucasian tribes around him.

When the tribes of the Caucasus began to flock to Mansur, the Russians became concerned and decided to destroy the movement before it became a serious threat. On 26 June 1785⁴⁵ a force of some 7000 soldiers under Colonel Pieri left Kumkale ('the Sand-Castle', the local name of Georgievsk) for Aldi, Mansur's home village.⁴⁶ On his way Pieri was met by an envoy from Mansur, who told the colonel that the Imam was not making war against the Russians

because he had no permission from the Ottoman government to do so. The messenger promised that ‘he [Mansur] will wage war on them when Allah commands so, and then it will be appropriate for them to be ready to fight’.⁴⁷ In the meantime, however, since they were not at war, he asked the Russians to go back to their headquarters, warning that if their troops continued to advance, war would be unavoidable and the responsibility for it would lie entirely with Pieri. The colonel rejected Mansur’s ultimatum, stating that he would not return without capturing Mansur and setting his village on fire.⁴⁸

The village of Aldi was destroyed. Mansur and most of the residents managed to escape before the Russians’ arrival, but his brother was killed. With a force of some 12,000 men (the number given by Ottoman sources), Mansur attacked the Russian force on its way back, decimating it. Out of 7000 men only a hundred soldiers survived, among them Prince Bagration, a member of the Georgian ruling house and at the time a probationer in the Russian army.⁴⁹ The Russians were compelled to retreat to the river Manich and all their equipment, including artillery, was seized by Mansur.⁵⁰ After a short while the Russians asked Mansur to return the artillery. His reply was:

I told you not to come upon us, but you did not listen and attacked us. I shall not return to you the artillery even though I do not need it. I have already sent it to the Pasha of the Ottoman Sultan [ie. the governor of Soğucak].⁵¹

There is no information as to whether Mansur indeed sent the cannon to the Ottomans, but from his response, it is clear that the Caucasians were not able to use them.

Following the defeat at Aldi, on 26 June, the Russian forces in the Caucasus were placed on the defensive. The forces in Georgia were pulled back to the Caucasian Line. Minor positions and forts were abandoned and the troops concentrated between three major fortresses—Mozdok, Kizliar and Eka-terinodar.⁵² According to Ferah Ali Pasha’s⁵³ reports, the Russian forces in the Kuban area were leaving their positions, including the bridge opposite the Ottoman fort of Hacilar,⁵⁴ which they destroyed.⁵⁵

In the Caucasus, the Russian defeat was received with enormous excitement. Mansur’s fame increased to an unprecedented degree and people began to speak of him as of a saviour sent by God. Large numbers of people from all over the Northern Caucasus flocked to his side and most of Daghestan and Chechnya now accepted his leadership. The Kabartay, who joined Mansur in fighting the Russians, sold their *ganimets* (booty) in Ottoman forts, such as Anapa and Soğucak, which impressed the Circassian tribes and convinced them to join Shaykh Mansur as well.⁵⁶ Thus, attacks on the Russian defence lines multiplied and the success of at least some of them further increased Mansur’s fame and the number of his followers.⁵⁷ He now chose a yellow, red and green banner and his warriors began to dress in the same colours.⁵⁸

On 15 July 1785, Mansur attacked the fortress of Kizliar.⁵⁹ His forces occupied the outer section of the fortress, but were unable to breach the inner section. When a reinforcement of Cossacks arrived and attacked them, they

retreated in disorder. This failure had a negative impact on his followers, so Mansur made a new move. He invited the Kabartay to join him and attacked the small fortress of Grigoripolis, located between Mozdok and Vladikavkaz. However, Grigoripolis defended itself resolutely until Russian reinforcements arrived, and Mansur was forced to retreat again.⁶⁰ Between 19 and 21 August 1785 he attacked Kizliar once more, because of public pressure. Again the attack failed.⁶¹ Mansur's forces attacked some Russian villages in the vicinity of the fortress and returned. Russian military superiority and the lack of military discipline among Mansur's men were the major reasons for these failures.

In view of these attacks, the Russian Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus, Pavel Potemkin, sent Colonel Nagel, with a small force, against Mansur, whose camp included Chechens, Kabartay, Kumyks and Daghestanis. On 2 November 1785, the two armies met in battle at Tatartub near the Terek river. Mansur's force was routed, the Kumyks returned to their territory and Mansur escaped to the Ottoman fortress of Anapa.⁶²

In 1786, Mansur continued his attacks from Acuban near the Kuban River to the east and from Kabarda to Mezdegü (Mozdok). The attacks from Kabarda, headed by three tribal chiefs, Ajgeriyukua, Adilgeri and Patokh Toke, compelled the Russians to leave Aleksandrovskaiia and Novaristove. In the Kuban area Mansur's forces occupied Boldarovskaia and destroyed four *stanitsas* (Cossack settlements); the Russians retreated along the Meya (Malaia) River and left the area.⁶³ They managed, however, to turn the table on him and Mansur again escaped to the Ottoman fortress of Anapa.⁶⁴

However, his escape to Anapa did not mean the end of his activities. He was soon leading attacks on Russians *stanitsas* once again, with his followers this time being mainly Circassians. In one of these raids they even got close to the capital city of the Don Cossacks, Cherkessk. They completely destroyed the *stanitsas* along the Yei (Iaik) River and the fort of Boldyrev. His successes made an impression and Istanbul learned that the Circassian and Abaza had begun to participate in the raids. This was, for example, revealed in an undated letter in Circassian, which the Commander of Soğucak received.⁶⁵

According to Bennigsen, in October 1786 Mansur sent his father-in-law to Potemkin to offer a peace treaty. However, Potemkin insisted on unconditional surrender.⁶⁶

The Ottoman Empire and Mansur

Having lost the Crimea to Russia in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottomans had no desire to get involved in any adventure with Russia; they wished to preserve the status quo. In particular, the Ottoman Empire wanted to prevent the Circassian tribes—its subjects—from carrying out any hostilities against the Russians. One of the most important duties of the commander of Soğucak, Ferah Ali Pasha, was to keep the Circassian tribes out of mischief.⁶⁷ Mansur's declaration of a holy war against Russia in 1785 complicated the Ottoman position, since his activities might influence the Circassians to carry out

attacks against the Russians and ultimately drag the Ottoman Empire into conflict with Russia.⁶⁸ No wonder, then, that the Ottomans viewed his actions with doubt, suspicion and concern. Ferah Ali Pasha was ordered to gather information about Mansur and his activities in the region.

In July 1785 the Pasha sent one of his men, Kazi Oğlu Mehmet, to Mansur. Upon his return Kazi Oğlu Mehmet reported that Mansur was calling the Daghestanis and the Tatars to a holy war (*jihad*) against the infidel Russians,⁶⁹ and that the Sheikh had prepared a seal with the inscription ‘*ve aiddu lehum mestat’tüm min, [] inne min Imam’ül Mansur ve inne Bismillah errahmanir-rahim’*.⁷⁰ Kazi Oğlu Mehmet was dispatched in the summer of 1785 to Istanbul in the company of Bolat Khan, a relative of Mansur, at the initiative of Ferah Ali Pasha. However, in Istanbul, Bolat Khan did not receive the welcome owing to a *persona grata* .⁷¹ It may be that either Ferah Ali Pasha or Shaykh Mansur was not deemed famous or important enough in Istanbul. Indeed, when Mansur became successful in his struggle against Russia, his popularity in Istanbul increased.

Another concern of the Ottoman government was Mansur’s attitude to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in September 1785 the Ottoman government instructed Ferah Ali Pasha and Keles Bey, the governor of Sohum, to collect accurate information on this matter.⁷² Keles Bey and other informants reported in the autumn of 1785 to the *Sadrazam* Halil Hamid Pasha and to the *Kaptan-ı Derya* (Commander of the Ottoman Naval Forces) Gazi Hasan Pasha that Mansur was still fighting with the Russians, but that he was not anti-Ottoman.⁷³

After his second failure at Kizliar, Mansur sought support for his struggle against Russia from the Muslim world at large and the Ottoman Empire in particular. Thus, in the summer of 1785, Bolat Khan and some Tatars were sent to the Hijaz, to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to seek support. The messengers also reached Anatolia and in a relatively short time, Mansur received positive responses from there. For example, Mehmet Riza, a notable from Sivas, and Seyyid Halil Efendi, a notable from Gaziantep, and his 200 followers joined Mansur’s force to fight the Russians in 1785.⁷⁴

Mansur also sent messages to the Ottoman government, recognising its high authority, and asked for support and an alliance, stating that he was on their side.⁷⁵ However, the Ottomans remained suspicious of Mansur and stayed aloof. His rising popularity in Anatolia and among the rank and file of the army in the Caucasus helped dissuade the Ottomans from their suspicions. Thus, for example, when *Kethuda* (a high military officer) Hasan revolted because of a disagreement with Bicanzade Ali Pasha, he wanted to give the artillery in the Soğucak fort to Mansur. Bicanzade Ali Pasha, who had replaced Ferah Ali Pasha in October 1785,⁷⁶ arrested him and had him beheaded.⁷⁷ This event clearly demonstrates that the Ottoman governors in the region did not have an established view of Mansur, but there was some (perhaps even a great deal of) sympathy for Mansur among the rank and file. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government was determined not to get into trouble with Russia by helping Mansur.

Mansur and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787–1791

All this changed when the Russo-Ottoman war broke out. The Ottoman Empire sent *firmans* and expensive gifts to the Caucasian tribes in an effort to mobilise them to fight on its side.⁷⁸ In 1787–1788, Mansur, for his part, sent letters to the Ottoman government expressing his enthusiasm and pleasure and promising his full support. He stated that he was not sleeping nights, but fighting for the cause.⁷⁹ Indeed, he launched another campaign in the Western Caucasus. However, his force, consisting of Circassians and Nogays, was beaten twice: on 20 September between the Urup and Laba rivers and again in October at the Urup.⁸⁰ In the autumn of 1788, Mansur's force was routed by the Russians under the Tsar's new commander, General Tekelli, and Mansur again escaped to Anapa.

The Russians now decided to attack Anapa, which had by then become one of the most important Ottoman fortresses in the area. The capture of Anapa would enable the Russians to cut the main artery of communications between the Ottomans and the Caucasian tribes and significantly diminish Ottoman involvement in the fighting there. The first Russian attack, in the autumn of 1788, was repulsed.⁸¹ The second assault, in January 1789 under a new commander—Bibikov—ended in disaster. While the fortress resisted stubbornly, the Circassians attacked the besieging Russian forces from the rear. Finally, Bibikov decided to withdraw, but lost almost all his soldiers during the retreat.⁸²

The Ottoman Empire decided to take advantage of this situation and move to the offensive on both land and sea. The naval offensive was defeated on 9 August 1789, while on land, Battal Hüseyin Pasha was ordered to march into Kabarda. At the same time, letters and gifts were sent to the heads of the Kabartay tribes and the Daghestani statelets to induce them to join the Pasha. Mansur joined this effort. At the beginning of 1790 he returned to Chechnya to renew the struggle in the Eastern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area. He tried to promote his interpretation of Islam among the Kazakhs and mobilise them to jointly attack Astrakhan.⁸³ However, since none of this materialised, one can assume that he failed, and by 1791 he was back in Anapa.

Battal Hüseyin Pasha⁸⁴ was appointed as *Serasker* (General) to Anapa by the Ottoman government on 26 November 1788. When he arrived in Anapa, in January 1789, the Russia forces, led by Bibikov, had already besieged the fort.⁸⁵ On 9 August 1790, Battal Hüseyin Pasha marched into Kabarda with an army of about 30,000 men and Circassian auxiliaries.⁸⁶ At Toqtamish he met a numerically inferior Russian army. According to Baddeley and Bennigsen, in the ensuing battle the Russians prevailed, and Battal Hüseyin Pasha himself was taken prisoner.⁸⁷ Some Ottoman writers claim, on the contrary, that no battle took place and that the Pasha simply surrendered as the fighting was about to begin.⁸⁸ Whatever the truth, this event laid Anapa open to new Russian attacks. Indeed, in June 1791, the Russians, under the command of Gudovich, attacked Anapa for the third time and conquered it, with heavy losses. At this point, the Russians also captured Mansur.⁸⁹ The Ottoman Empire officially demanded that

Russia return Mansur, but was refused on the grounds that as a Chechen, he was not an Ottoman subject.⁹⁰

The Ottomans thus failed to take advantage of this opportunity to gain the loyalty of the tribes and consolidate their position in the Caucasus. Their governors and commanders in the Caucasus seem to have been too passive. Or perhaps the Russians excelled in the art of divide and rule. The fact is that Russia continued its presence and expansion in the region at the expense of the Ottomans.

The most important reason for the Ottoman failure seems to have been its two-faced policy towards the Caucasus, which continued into the 19th century. When it was at war with Russia, the Ottoman Empire approached the Caucasian tribes for help and support. However, in times of peace, it ignored their struggle, preferring to maintain the status quo in the region.⁹¹ The result was that the Ottoman Empire lost its credibility among the tribes. Nevertheless, in almost every instance the Caucasian tribes backed the Ottoman Empire and fought against Russia on its side.

Conclusion

The captive Mansur was taken first to St Petersburg and then to Tsarskoe Selo to be shown to Catherine.⁹² He was accused and found guilty of organising the Caucasian tribes to fight against Russia. Mansur was imprisoned in the fortress of Schlisselbürg, where he lived for three years. He died in April 1794.⁹³ His treatment was in sharp contrast to that of Sheikh Shamil, 68 years later. After his surrender in 1859, Alexander II treated Shamil as a hero and allocated funds to keep him under house arrest—not in prison—in Russia, with dignity and an appropriate standard of living.

Mansur's death did not end the struggle against Russia; quite the opposite. It is true that from the start of his struggle in 1785 to his capture in 1791, he inflicted heavy losses on the Russians, but his influence went far beyond this immediate result. Imam Mansur has a unique place in the history of the Caucasus because he

... was the first to preach and lead the [...] Holy War against the infidel Russians in the Caucasus [...] and] in his endeavour to unite [...] the fierce tribes of mountain and forest, he it was who first taught them that in religious reform lay the one chance of preserving their cherished liberty and independence.⁹⁴

Indeed, one might say that with Mansur's appearance in 1785, the history of the Caucasus changed course and entered a new period. The impact of his ideas and actions continued for many years to come, and were translated into the Muridist movement in the next century. The core of this movement was the struggle against infidel Russia, which attempted to conquer the Caucasus. It can therefore be labelled 'the independence war of the Caucasians'.⁹⁵ The three Daghestani Imams in the 19th century, Ghazi Muhammad, Hamza Bey and Shamil, followed Mansur's principles and ideas. Mansur's mission, in his own words, was thus

'only to prepare the ground. After me there will be a person whose mission is to execute.'⁹⁶

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21. Hasim Efendi, 'Ahval-i Anapa ve Cerâkise', Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ms, No 1569, ff. 2 recto–2 verso; Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, p 162.
22. Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Un mouvement populaire au Caucase du XVIII^e siècle: la 'Guerre Sainte' de Sheikh Mansur (1785–1794). Page mal connue et controversée des relations Russo-Turques,' *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol V, No 2 (April–June 1964), p 195.
23. The Naqshbandiyya order was founded by Bahauddin Naqshband in Bukhara. In the late eighteenth century it spread into the North Caucasus. When Shaykh Shamil surrendered to the Russians in 1859, the influence of the Naqshbandiyya in the region had dramatically decreased. The Qadiriyya order filled the vacuum in the region. See also, Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Sufi ve Komiser: Rusya'da İslam Tarikatları*, Transl. Osman Tuter (Ankara, 1988), pp 79–93; Austin Lee Jersild, 'Who was Shamil?: Russian colonial rule and Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus, 1859–1917', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 14, No 2 (1995), p 205. The Naqshbandiyya, influential in Chechnya and Daghestan, regarded the war with Russia, its religious enemy, as an obligation.
24. Muhammed Tahir'ül-Karakhi, in Tarik Cemal Kutlu, ed, *İmam Şamil'in Gazavâtı* (İstanbul 1987), p 7.
25. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, pp 72–73.
26. Since I have not quoted the views of Bennigsen, Baddeley and Kafı, see: Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 170; Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, pp 72–73; Kadircan Kafı, *Şimali Kafkasya* (İstanbul, 1942), p 81.
27. Kerim Fenari, 'The Jihad of Imam Shamil', *Q-News* (England), February 1995, p 5. For a detailed survey

- of the impact of Mansur in Italy, see Franco Venturi, 'The legend of Boetti Sheikh Mansur', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 10, No 1–2, 1991, pp 93–101.
28. Paul B. Henze, *Kafkaslar'da Ateş ve Kılıç: XIX Yüzyılda Kafkasya Dağ Köylülerinin Direnişisi*, Trans. Akın Kızısetorunu (Ankara, 1985), p 33, n 11.
 29. Kafli, op cit, Ref 26, p 81.
 30. Moshe Gammer, 'A preliminary to decolonizing the historiography of Shaykh Mansur', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol 32, No 1, 1996, p 194.
 31. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 73; Kafli, op cit, Ref 26, p 81.
 32. N Iorga, *Osmanlı Tarihi Osmanlı Tarihi (1774–1912)*, Vol V, Trans. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (Ankara, 1948), p 43.
 33. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 73.
 34. Bek Sultan Batırhan considers the birth date on Mansur as 1748—Bek Sultan Batırhan, 'Seyh Mansur', *Kafkasya*, Vol I, No 6, 1965, p 4.
 35. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, p 162; Aytek Kundukh, in Tarık Cemal Kutlu, ed, *Kafkasya Muiridizmi (Gazavat Tarihi)* (İstanbul, 1987), p 31; Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, op cit, Ref 23, p 93; Cemal Gökçe, *Kafkasya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kafkasya Siyaseti* (İstanbul, 1979), p 117; Gammer, op cit, p 192; Nart, 'The Life of Mansur', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 1, No 1–2, 1991, p 84. Also see Osman Köse, 'Küçük Kaynarca Andlaşması (Oluşumu-Tahlili-Tatbiki)', Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü (Samsun, 1997; unpublished PhD dissertation), p 323.
 36. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, p 240.
 37. A hajji from the Caucasus reported that he was a shepherd who, after a while, appeared as Mansur, prohibiting alcohol and tobacco. BOA, Hatt-i Hümayun (HH), No 1011/C, report by Merchant Mahmud Tatar, 2 şevval 1199 (6 July 1785).
 38. Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 117.
 39. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 73.
 40. BOA, HH, No 74, letter from Imam Mansur to the Sadaret; HH, No 1247, letter from Imam Mansur to the governor of Soğucak, 1200 (1785–1786).
 41. From a pamphlet Mansur circulated in the Caucasus: At the beginning of this document, originally in Arabic, it is written that the document was brought by a messenger from Mansur, BOA, HH No 1247–1248, letter from Imam Mansur to the governor of Soğucak, 1200 (1785–1786).
 42. Berkok, op cit, Ref 2, p 381.
 43. BOA, HH, No 1308, governor of Çıldır, Süleyman Pasha, to the Sadaret (İstanbul) 12 Muharrem 1202 (6 November 1787).
 44. BOA, HH, No 1351, A letter from Imam Mansur to the governor of Soğucak (1787). Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, p 220.
 45. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 186.
 46. BOA, HH, No 1011/B, Ali Ağa's, Kaftancisi of Ferah Ali Pasha, report, selh Şevval 1199 (July 1785), HH, 1011/D, report of Ferah Ali Pasha, governor of Soğucak, n. d.; Nart, op cit, Ref 35, pp 86–87.
 47. BOA, HH, No 1011/B, Ali Ağa's, Kaftancisi Kaftancisi Ferah Ali Pasha report, selh Şevval 1199 (July 1785).
 48. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 73.
 49. Ibid, p 74.
 50. BOA, HH, No 1305, İç çukadarı Ali's report, 1200 (Eylül 1785); Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 121.
 51. BOA, HH, 1011/B, Kaftancisi Ali Ağga's report, selh Şevval 1199 (July 1785), Köse, op cit, Ref 35, p 325.
 52. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 187.
 53. He was the governor of Soğucak between 1781 and 1785, and he died there. He worked both to establish Ottoman rule in the region and to convert the Circassian tribes to İslam. See Zübeyde Güneş Yağcı; 'Ferah Ali paşasının Soğucak Muhafızlığı (1781–1785)', Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü (Samsun, 1997; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation); Paul B. Henze, 'Circassian resistance to Russia', in Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, ed, *The North Caucasus Barrier* (London, 1992), pp 74–75.
 54. A small fort constructed by Ferah Ali Pasha.
 55. BOA, HH, No 1011/D, Ali Pasha's, Governor of Soğucak, report, gurre-i Zilkade 1199 (5 September 1785).
 56. BOA, HH, No 1011/B, Kaftancı Ali Ağa's report, selh Şevval 1199 (July 1785); Habicoğlu, op cit, p 16.
 57. BOA, HH, No 1011/B; Habicoğlu, op cit, Ref, p 16.
 58. Efendi, op cit, Ref 21, f 59 recto.
 59. BOA, HH, No 1305-A, unsigned, undated.
 60. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 188, Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 74.
 61. Ibid, pp 74–75.

62. Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 123; Berkok, op cit, Ref 2, p 386. It was an unlucky coincidence that in 1846 Shamil was defeated in the very place where Mansur had lost the war 60 years before—Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 191.
63. İsmail Berkok, *Tarihte Kafkasya* (İstanbul, 1958), p 386. Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 123.
64. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 193.
65. The letter runs as follows: ‘My Lord, if you would like to ask about Mansur, the news are good. All we do is fight the infidels day and night. Although we are very few in numbers [...], God Almighty has granted us strength and victory. [However,] do not get the impression that we possess sufficient strength to continue this war. In fact, our success depends on your help and prayers. This country belongs to the *Padishah* [the Ottoman Sultan]. If you give the order, we are ready for war in the coming spring. There are a few Muscovite soldiers in the Crimea. The Russian Commander All their forces, including the detachment in Kumkale have been sent against Mansur [Efendim Mansur ahvalinde sual olunur ise pek güzeldir ve kuffar-ı haksar tarafından istifsar buyrulur ise her gün isimiz cenktir. Egerce askerimiz azdır ve lakin Hak Subhanellahu Teala Hazretleri nusret ve kuvvet ihsan ediyor bu tarafta her gün ve her saat cenk etmekteyiz. ... Siz efendimizin da-yi haber ve nazar-ı inayet ve husn-u himmeti kuvvet veridiğiyle cesaret ideruz ve memleket dahi Padisahımızdır. simdi bu minval uzere ve Padisahımızdan ferman gelur ise baharın İnsallhu Teala cenge hazır oluruz. Kırım’da Moskov askeri az kalmıştır. Cumle askerini Imam Mansur uzere gondermistir. Kumkale’de olan askerini dahi Imam Mansur uzere gondermistir]—BOA, HH, No 801, Petition of Circassian Notables to the Sadrazam, (undated).
66. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 191.
67. The powers and responsibilities of Ferah Ali Pasha were as follows: the immediate repair of the Soğucak fort, the reconstruction of Anapa and the protection and provision of Circassian and Abhazian tribes. He also had responsibility for these tribes, to ensure that they observed the decisions of the Küçük Kainarca treaty, and moreover was to make ongoing reports on circumstances on the banks of the Kuban and in Circassia to the authorities of the Ottoman Empire—BOA, Cevdet Askeriye, No 1006, order to Ferah Ali Pasha, 9 Muharrem 1196, (25 December 1781); Mühimme Defter, No 181, f 181; Ali Emiri. *Abdülhamid I.*, No 1386, Order of *Sadrazam* to the newly appointed governor, Ferah Ali Pasha (undated).
68. Indeed, some Circassian tribes responded to Mansur’s calls and carried out raids across the Russian border in 1785; Russia officially asked the Ottoman government to stop these attacks. In order to convince the tribes to desist from such raids, Ferah Ali Pasha asked the *Sadrazam* (Grand Vezir) Halil Hamid Pasha to allocate some money for gifts to these tribes. However, since some officials in İstanbul suspected that Ferah Ali Pasha intended to put the money in his own pocket, the *Sadrazam* did not send the funds—Ibid, loc cit.
69. BOA, HH, No 1011/C, Merchant Mahmud Tatar’s report, 2 Şevval 1199 (10 June 1785), Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, Vol III, p 211.
70. BOA, HH, No 1011/C, Merchant Mahmud Tatar’s report, Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, Vol III, p 211.
71. Ibid, p 219, Sema Işıktan, ‘1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi Sırasında ve Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağıstan Hanları ile Münasebetleri’, *Kafkas Araştırmaları*, Vol I (İstanbul, 1992), p 38.
72. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, p 220; Tarik Cemal Kutlu, *İmam Mansur* (İstanbul, 1987), pp 42–45.
73. Efendi, op cit, Ref 21, ff 31 recto–31 verso.
74. Ahmet Vasıf, in Mücteba İlgürel, ed, *Mehasin’ul-Asar Vel Hakaiku’l-Ahbar* (Ankara, 1994), p 364, Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 118.
75. BOA, HH, 1305-A, undated.
76. Bicanzade Ali Pasha was appointed to the fort of Soğucak in October 1785, BOA, *Ali Emiri*, Abdülhamid I, No 5319, Appointment of Bicanzade Ali Pasha as Governor of Soğucak, 7 Zilhicce 1199 (11 October 1785) BOA, A:DVN: DVE, No 23/100, order sent to Bicanzade Ali pasha, evast-ı zilhicce 1199 (October 1785).
77. BOA, HH, Nos 1349, 1350, Bicanzade Ali Pasha’s reports, Bicanzade Ali Pasha’s report, No 25 Muharrem 1200 (28 November 1785).
78. Işıktan, op cit, pp 34–45.
79. LXXIX.BOA, HH, No 1351, A letter sent from Imam Mansur to the Sadaret (1787), HH, No 1351-A, A letter sent from to Governor of Soğucak (1787).
80. Ibid, p 194.
81. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, Vol V, p 135; Mehmet Edip, ‘Tarih-i Edip’, İstanbul Üniverstesi Kütüphanesi, Ms No 3220, f 55 recto.
82. Semen Esadze, *Çerkesya’nın Ruslar Tarafından İşgali*, Transl. Murat Paşuşu (Ankara, 1999), p 6.
83. Sharpudin B. Akhmedov, as quoted in Gammer, op cit, pp 197–98. Unfortunately I had no access to Akhmedov’s work.

84. Battal Hüseyin Pasha was the elder son of Canikli Ali Pasha, who was the governor of Trabzon. He was appointed governor and *Serasker* of Erzurum in 1784. After that he was appointed governor of Trabzon in 1788 and than appointed Serasker of Anapa on 26 November 1788. Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 151.
85. Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 150.
86. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, Vol V, p 143.
87. Bennigsen, op cit, Ref 22, p 190; Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 78.
88. Pasha, op cit, Ref 15, Vol V, p 144; Gökçe, op cit, Ref 35, p 159.
89. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 78.
90. Abdullah Saydam, 'Kuzey Kafkasya'daki Bağımsızlık Hareketleri', *Kıbrıs'tan Kafkasya'ya Osmanlı Dünyasında Siyaset Adalet ve Raiyyet* (Trabzon, 1998), p 308; Şerafettin Erel, *Dağıstan ve Dağıstanlılar* (İstanbul, 1961), p 118.
91. Moshe Gammer, 'Shamil and the Ottomans: a preliminary overview', *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi (21-25 Ağustos)* (İstanbul, 1989), pp 387-394.
92. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 79.
93. Nart, op cit, Ref 35, p 91; Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 79.
94. Baddeley, op cit, Ref 8, p 72.
95. Bedri Habicoglu, *Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya Göçler (ve İskânlar)* (İstanbul, 1993), p 54, n 1.
96. Ahmet Hazer Hızal, *Kuzey Kafkasya* (Ankara, 1962), p 37.

